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JUSTICE HARLAN'S CONSERVATISM AND
ALTERNATIVE POSSIBILITIES*
KENT GREENAWALT**

I. IN WHAT SENSES WAS JUSTICE HARLAN CONSERVATIVE?
Bruce Ackerman and Charles Fried's rich essays 1 address the subject
of Justice Harlan as a conservative. One who comes to this topic has in
mind questions like: Was Justice Harlan a conservative? If so, what kind
of a conservative was he? How did his judicial actions exemplify a
conservative approach? Most importantly, is his conservatism an appealing
model for modern judicial practice?
Professors Ackerman and Fried's slices on this topic reflect their own
casts of mind and philosophies of judging. Fried looks at a broad range of
Justice Harlan's opinions and sets them against particular conservative
qualities that Fried commends. He manages a few acerbic swipes at those
who have failed to exhibit these virtues, most notably Justice Douglas.
Ackerman presents a contrast of two grand themes, two fundamentally
opposed approaches to constitutional adjudication. Justice Black, with his
expressed views somewhat improved by constructive re-creation, is
revealed as an Ackermanian hero who begins with big general ideas and
works down; Justice Harlan's common law approach to constitutional
decision making is shown to have grave defects. Although Ackerman's
final paragraph says he has not "done much more than express some
doubts" 2 about Harlan's method, no reader will fail to grasp Ackerman's
own strong commitment to the contrary approach.
What is a conservative judge? Wisely perhaps, neither Fried nor
Ackerman take this question head on. But I think that facing it allows one
better to understand Justice Harlan's place and how the two essays relate
to him and to each other. Distinguishing conservatism in basic social
philosophy, conservatism in politics, and conservatism in judging is a
helpful start.
With controversy and confusion reigning about what is true
conservatism in each arena, I settle· here for brief assertion rather than

* Presented at the New York Law School Centennial Conference in Honor of Justice
John Marshall Harlan (Apr. 20, 1991).
** University Professor, Columbia University School of Law.
1. Bruce Ackerman, The Comnwn Law Constitution of John Marshall Harlan, 36
N.Y.L. SCH. L. REY. 5 (1991); Charles Fried, The Conservatism of Justice H{Jrlan, 36
N.Y.L. SCH. L: REY. 33 (1991).
2. Ackerman, supra note 1, at 32.
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developed argument. Conservatism in social philosophy involves limited
confidence in the ability of human beings to understand themselves and
their societies, skepticism about abstract ideas, fear of radical social
changes based on the application of abstract ideas, and severe doubt that
people can restructure their societies in fundamental ways to produce
human beings and institutions of a much "higher" order. Political
conservatism is wedded to traditions and leery of altering the status quo;
it opposes gross political reform. Since most reform in the history of our
country has been toward the left, political conservatives are on the "right"
side of the political spectrum. Edmund Burke's Reflections on the
Revolution in France, 3 with its eloquent opposition to radical change
based on abstract, optimistic ideas of the French Enlightenment, is
understandably the most revered of conservative texts; reading it
illuminates how conservatism in social philosophy ties to political
conservatism. But the two are not always joined. By most criteria, Richard
Posner's claims that "wealth maximization" should govern a social order'
do not represent a conservative social philosophy. In our comparatively
capitalist society, however, those claims may have politically conservative
implications, supporting existing power and opposing major social change.
Reinhold Niebuhr, a leading Christian thinker, had a deeply unhopeful
view about human nature and what social orders might achieve, but his
sensitivity to social injustice led him to urge substantial reform toward the
left. 5 He was politically liberal and philosophically conservative.
Conservatism in judging concerns the criteria judges employ to decide
cases. Although the phrase "judicial restraint" does not appear in either
Ackerman or Fried's essay, I think of conservatism in judging cases as
something close to exercising judicial restraint, if not identical with it. A
conservative judge conserves and carefully elaborates upon what
predecessors have done rather than striking out on his or her own in an
active way. In constitutional cases, there are three obvious sources of what
the judge might conserve. The first is the original Constitution or
Amendments: what is in the text itself or the understandings of the
adopters. A second source is decisions by the federal political branches
and state governments. A third is the body of doctrine and values
developed in earlier judicial opinions. Although one can trace connections
3. EDMUND BURKE, REFl.EcTIONS ON THE REVOLUTION IN FRANCE {J .G. Pocock ed.,
1987).
4. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW {3d ed. 1986);
Richard A. Posner, Utilitarianism, Economics, and Legal Theory, 8 J. LEGAL Snm. 103
(1979).

5. See RE!NHOID NIEBUHR, THE IRONY OF AMERICAN HISTORY (1952); RE!NHOID
NIEBUHR, THE NATIJRE AND DESTINY OF :MAN (1941); REINHOID NIEBUHR, AN
INTERPRETATION OF CHRISTIAN Ennes (1935).
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between broader conservatism and conservatism in judging, someone who
is philosophically and politically a liberal might believe that courts should
have a limited role in the politics of a democracy and, therefore, endorse
a highly conservative role for judges. Felix Frankfurter was certainly not
a political conservative, let he was a strong proponent of judicial restraint
in constitutional cases. His example is particularly important for us
because he had a great influence on Justice Harlan during Harlan's early
years on the Supreme Court.
Where did Justice Harlan stand? He was a judicial conservative in all
three senses of restrained judging. As Ackerman and Fried both
emphasize, he was hesitant to overrule earlier decisions and break with
established doctrines. He was also hesitant to overturn decisions of the
political branches and to disregard what he thought was a decisive
understanding to be found in the constitutional text and intentions of the
adopters.
Without going beyond the evidence of his opinions and my
impressions during the tremendously rewarding year I spent with him as ·
a law clerk, I am confident that he was conservative, at least moderately
conservative, in social philosophy. He had no appetite for grandiose
intellectual schemes or programs of social reform. I believe he would have
agreed with Michael Oakeshott that government is a practical discipline,
learned mostly through practice rather than by mastering abstract ideas. 7
Justice Harlan believed that judges should detach themselves from
ordinary politics, and he did not vote in elections after becoming a judge.
He talked rather little (at least to clerks) about political issues, but my
sense is that he was somewhere near the middle of the political spectrum,
particularly sensitive to intrusions into personal life, and probably further
toward the left on issues of civil liberty and international relations than on
issues of economic and social policy. This is the understanding of Justice
Harlan and of conservatism that I bring to these papers.
Ackerman and Fried convey a good sense of Justice Harlan and his
judicial philosophy. That philosophy was not systematic; it was mainly
expressed in what he did and articulated when needed as particular issues
arose. In my experience, Harlan was both resigned to his role as a
dissenter and relatively sanguine about the long-term health of the
Supreme Court and the country. He cared very deeply about trying to get
things right, and this motivated his high standards of scholarly craft, but
6. See, for example, Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 267 (1962) (Frankfurter, J.,
dissenting), where Frankfurter stated that "[d]isregard of the inherent limits in the effective
exercise of the Court's 'judicial Power' not only presages the futility of judicial intervention
in the essentially political conflict of forces ..• [but] may well impair the Court's position
as the ultimate organ of 'the Supreme Law of the Land.'"
7. See MICHAEL OAKESHOTI, RATIONAUSM IN POilTICS 129 (1962).
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he faced defeat with equanimity, displaying the almost stoic quality
Ackerman mentions in connection with more personal travails. 8 Fried
talks about Harlan being "enraged," and his strong opinions reflecting
"wrath. " 9 I respect Fried's mastery of the language too much to suppose
that these are just loose words meant as equivalents for very strong
dissents, but during my time as a clerk, during which major constitutional
decisions went against Harlan, I never witnessed anything approaching the
emotions of rage and wrath about majority results or opinions. Ackerman
puts a lot of stress on Harlan's "patrician" background. 10 Perhaps he is
right to suggest that that background deeply affected Harlan's selfconception. Nevertheless, I am sure Harlan would strongly have rejected
any notion that the health of the federal judiciary and the common law
approach of courts depended on a supply of patrician judges. Among the
judges he admired most were Hugo Black, Felix Frankfurter, and Henry
Friendly. Harlan's sense of an elite in the law was an elite of intelligence,
competence, diligence, and integrity, not an elite of background and class.
Harlan would not have shared Ackerman's worry about the ability of
judges in a pluralist society to carry forward common law traditions of
judging.
As Fried points out, Harlan's conservatism was hardly dogmatic. 11
He was unafraid to extend precedents or to innovate in directions typically
thought of as liberal when that seemed appropriate to him. His opinion for
the Court in Cohen v. Califomia 12 and his dissent in Poe v. Ullman 13
are especially notable, and Gerald Gunther reminds us that they are by no
means isolated examples. 14 Nevertheless, Harlan's judicial record overall
marked him as conservative both in the narrow judicial sense and in
broader senses of that word.

8. See Ackerman, supra note 1, at 10-11.
9. Fried, supra note 1, at 44-46.
10. See Ackerman, supra note 1, at 10.
11. See Fried, supra note 1, at 36-37, 50-51.
12. 403 U.S. 15 (1971).
13. 367 U.S. 497, 522 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
14. See Gerald Gunther, Another View of Justice Harlan-A Comment on Fried and
Ackerman, 36 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REY. 67, 69-70 (1991) (citing Street v. New York, 394
U.S. 576 (1969); Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463, 493 (1966) (Harlan, J.,
dissenting); Noto v. United States, 367 U.S. 290 (1961); Scales v. United States, 367 U.S.
203 (1961); Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298 (1957)).
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II. COMMON LAW CONSTITUTIONALISM AND THE SUSPECT
CONSERVATISM OF ACKERMAN'S INDEPENDENT CONSTITUTIONALISM
Ackerman contrasts the common law constitutional conservatism of
Justice Harlan against a model of what he calls an independent
constitutionalism "which is no less self-consciously conservative than
Justice Harlan's, but which differs radically in its understanding of the
tradition it proposes to conserve. " 15 We are presented, as it were, with
two versions of conservative constitutional adjudication. One is to develop
constitutional law step by step, in the manner of the common law. The
other is to glean major abstract ideas represented by constitutional
movements, and to develop and apply them. The movements may result
in new constitutional texts, such as the original Constitution, the Bill of
Rights, and the Reconstruction Amendments, but they need not, as the
New Deal did not, produce major change in any existing constitutional
text. For Ackerman, the difference in the two basic approaches to
constitutional decision making is highlighted by Wesberry v. Sanders, 16 ·
which he discusses at length. 17 Justice Harlan rejected the Court's view
that the original Constitution, through the phrase in Article I, Section 2,
that the "House of Representatives shall be ... chosen . . . by the People
of the several States, " 18 requires equal population districting within
states. 19 For Ackerman, Harlan's position "suggests the desperate lengths
he would go to deny that popular sovereignty is one of our Constitution's
foundational commitments, "20 and an "almost Pavlovian aversion to
encounters with the democratic aspect of our constitutional tradition. " 21
My comparing Harlan's approach in Wesberry with that of
Ackerman's independent constitutionalist is rendered difficult because
Ackerman's apparent view of some facts and inferences fron;i. facts is so
different from mine. Given the then shortly to be decided and more
important case of Reynolds v. Sims, 22 which required equal population
apportionment for state legislatures under the Equal Protection Clause, the
15. Ackerman, supra note 1, at 7-8.
16. 376 U.S. 1 (1964). Some diligent reader might discover that Wesbeny was decided
during the Tenn when I was a law clerk, so it may be well to note that I did not work on
the case and that what I write here does not depend on personal recollection of how Justice
Harlan regarded the case.
17. See Ackerman, supra note 1, at 12-18.
18. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 1.
19. See Wesbeny, 376 U.S. at 24 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
20. Ackerman, supra note 1, at 16.
21. Id.
22. 377 U.S. 533 (1964). ~eynolds was argued five days before Wesbeny was argued.
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Court might have handled Wesberry differently. It could have reached
essentially the same conclusion through the equality component of the
Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause, or said explicitly that the
language of Article I should receive a creative reading in light of equal
protection values. 23 But Justice Black's opinion for the Court in Wesberry
is squarely grounded in the text of Article I, Section 2. The words
"chosen . . . by the People" 24 are said to mandate equal districts, a
conclusion bolstered by the allocation, in the same Section, of
representatives to states primarily on the basis of population. 25
How persuasive is Justice Black's conclusion? Relying upon the
materials presented in the Black and Harlan opinions, I think the "original
intent" was not to correct malapportionments. To be more precise, I
believe that that possibility was neither in the minds of the adopters nor
would have occurred to a reasonable, contemporaneous, trained reader of
the language. Not only would adopters and reasonable readers have denied
that equal population districts were a specific objective of the language, .
they would not have supposed that the clause was appropriately open to
later extension of that sort. Some fervent believers in equal districting
might have "hoped" for. such an extension if asked, but few would have
expected it or thought it proper for a judge. If asked, nearly all would
have said: "This clause is about direct election, not equal population
districts."
Various factors make this conclusion seem compelling to me. Section
3 of Article I says that senators from each state shall be "chosen by the
Legislature thereof. "26 The structure of the phrase "chosen .. , by the
People" and its placing in a parallel position to the contrasting phrase of
Section 3 show that its main and obvious purpose was to establish direct
election of representatives as a balance to the indirect election of senators
(not altered until 1913 by the Seventeenth Amendment2'1). The phrase
"by the People". is inadequate to suggest equal districting. Using
population as the primary device to apportion representatives among states
hardly amounts to requiring equal population districting within states.
States had to have the same electors for representatives as for the most
numerous branch of the state legislatures, but this permitted them to
exclude altogether not only women and blacks, but many white adult
males as well. Section 2 adopted a three-fifths formula for counting slaves
23. I do not mean to imply that either of these avenues would have been
uncontroversial.
24. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3.
25. See Wesbeny, 376 U.S. at 7-8, 17-18.
26. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 1.
27. U.S. CONST. amend. XVII.
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in determining representation in the House of Representatives. 28 As a
clear compromise, a slave was to count as three-fifths of a person in
deciding how many seats a state would receive. If Section 2 were assumed
to require equal population districting within states, how were states to
count slaves? Was the three-fifths formula to extend to states' districting,
or could they perhaps count each slave as anywhere between zero and
one? It is extremely unlikely that the federal provision was meant to
embroil federal courts in deciding these slave-counting questions. Finally,
the districts for state legislatures that picked senators could be grossly
malapportioned. If that was acceptable, it is implausible that unrevealing
words were understood to demand equal apportionment . for House
districts. 29
In my view, no sincere, moderately competent, originalist approach
that relies heavily on the specific text of Article I, Section 2, can reach the
conclusion arrived at in Wesberry. But that is precisely the argument made
by Justice Black for the Court.30 One reason why Justice Harlan
concentrated so hard on original meaning in Wesberry was because that
was what the majority relied upon. His dissent needed to rebut the
majority's claims. But this is hardly a full explanation, because Harlan
also focused on original meaning in Reynolds v. Sims, 31 although the
majority there did not. Another reason for his attention in Wesberry was
that he regarded the crucial clause as not relevantly open-ended and
subject to changing application with the times-it simply had nothing to
do with how states chose to district. Finally, no significant prior case bore
on the disputed issue. Contrary to what Ackerman says, I do not find it
"odd" that in Wesberry Harlan departed from his usual attention to
developed case law and paid so much attention to original intent. 32
28. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3.

a

29. Congress retained
supervisoi:y control over state districting for elections to
Congress. Comments focused on that power suggest that the states were otherwise to have
great discretion, not that Congress was to enforce an equal population requirement already
established. See A.B.A. SPECIAL COMM. ON ELECTION LAW AND VOTER PARTICIPATION,
CONGRE.SSIONALREDISTRICTING 18-19 {1981).
30. See Wesbeny, 376 U.S. at 7-8, 18.
31. 377 U.S. 533, 589 (1964) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
32. Ackerman says some puzzling things about Harlan's acceptance of the idea that
racially motivated malapportionments are unconstitutional. See Ackerman, supra note 1,
at 13-15, 14 n.22. For Ackerman, this acceptance undermines Harlan's intentionalist
approach to the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause. But if it takes the
Fifteenth Amendment's explicit language about denial of the vote on the basis of race to
protect voting rights of blacks, that only strengthens the argument that the Fourteenth
Amendment did not protect the voting rights of blacks (unless it seems, on balance, that the
Fifteenth Amendment was clarificatoi:y), and also strengthens the argument that the Equal
Protection Clause did not protect voting rights in general.
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Reading Ackerman's essay suggests that he disagrees almost down the
line with what I have just said. He apparently thinks that the arguments in
Wesberry are pretty much of a toss-up if one is to concentrate, unwisely
in his view, on the narrow significance of Section 2. If Ackerman really
does think $at, this suggests to me how much the attraction of "big ideas"
empowers people to delude themselves about small recalcitrant details.
In any event, I believe that Ackerman's main response to what I have
said, and to the claims in Harlan's opinion, is that they don't r~ally make
much difference. Even if the narrow originalist argument favors Harlan,
and favors him strongly, Section 2 should be interpreted in light of big
themes, including those emphasized by later constitutional movements.
Fair representation is a big theme to be found in constitutional movements,
and equal districting is an appropriate way to carry that theme through.
Thus, the independent constitutionalist rightly reaches the Wesberry result
as an application of Section 2.
My objective here is not to argue that this conclusion is wrong. I
believe that, despite what may have been a limiting original understanding,
the Equal Protection Clause was appropriately applied to voting, and that
roughly equal population districting was the only administrable rule to
achieve · fairness in apportionment. Imposing a similar rule for
congressional districting was also appropriate, and it mattered little,
practically, whether that was done through the language of Section 2 or
through the equality component of the Fifth Amendment's Due Process
Clause. The Constitution should be read as a .whole, and subsequently
adopted text should affect how the original Constitution is interpreted,
although the reading of "by the People" in Wesberry does seem to me to
be on the far edge of what is appropriate in creative construction of
constitutional language. Justice Black's simplistic "on its face" textual
approach cannot be defended, but that is not of large importance for
whether the Court's result, which the independent constitutionalist would
also reach, is to be preferred to Justice Harlan's result.
What I want to explore is what Wesberry reveals about the
conservatism of Ackerman's independent constitutionalist approach.
Ackerman says that this approach is "no less self-consciously conservative
than Justice Harlan's, but it differs radically in its understanding of the
tradition it proposes to conserve. "33 According to Ackerman, for an
independent constitutionalist, "one cannot understand the Founders or their
great successors without recognizing that they were great gamblers on the
power of untested abstractions. " 34 This sentence follows a sentence
· indicating that the independent and common law constitutionalists have
33. Id. at 7-8.
34. Id. at 9.
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"competing orientations to rationality." 35 The 'independent
constitutionalist, we may conclude, distills central abstract ideas from the
country's major constitutional movements, and then applies them to the
subject matter at hand. He owes no special deference to: (1) the linguistic
import .of individual clauses or the adopters' narrow intentions for those
clauses, (2) the judgments of contemporary political branches, or (3)
doctrines or values reflected in judicial opinions. Certainly in applying
those central abstract ideas, the independent constitutionalist displays none
of the earmarks of judicial conservatism or conservatism in social
philosophy. He starts at the top and uses reason to derive specific
conclusions-precisely the mode of social analysis of which conservatives
are leery. But, Ackerman may respond, the independent constitutionalist
is conservative in conserving our central constitutional traditions, even if
these call for approaches to particular cases that are decidedly
unconservative in their methodology.
This response would be misleading in two respects. The first respect
concerns selection of the central abstract ideas. Why, in reapportionment
disputes, is democratic equality to win out over federalism or some notion
of minimal interference of the judiciary with decisions about voting of
other bodies with authority gleaned from relevant texts? 36 When one is
interpreting ideas of large constitutional movements, one has a good bit
of latitude in picking central ideas and ordering their priority. Someone
who is conservative about methods of understanding will not feel very
comfortable with this endeavor. In any event, more is involved in the
independent constitutionalist's choice than determining central themes from
the tradition. He must first decide that the judge's role is to choose such
themes and apply them, because this concept of the judge's role best
represents our tradition. That the Constitution originally had no Bill of
Rights and that the first eight amendments applied only against the federal
government may be some indication that the Founders did not expect
courts applying the federal Constitution to play a major role in developing
basic political values. As for the Reconstruction Amendments, one can
emphasize the limited aspirations of the moderates rather than, as
Ackerman does, the much greater ambitions of the radical Republicans. 37
Suppose someone tried to look backward to the tradition without a
judgment about what kind of judicial role is best; he would be at least as
35. Id.
36. A more conservative way to reach the conclusion that courts should impose equal
population districts is to conclude that history shows that egregiously malapportioned state
legislatures will not make corrections that cause members to lose seats, that judicial
intervention is the only way to stop this, and that roughly equal districting turns out to be
the only manageable judicial standard.
37. See Ackerman, supra note 1, at 6, 9, 11-12.
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likely to settle on the restrained common law approach of Justice Harlan
as the central themes approach of the independent constitutionalist. The
choice to adopt the central themes approach does not itself flow from a
conservative perspective. Indeed, the central themes or independent
constitutionalist approach is nonconservative in its basic decision to look
for central abstract ideas, as well as in its choices among plausible central
abstract ideas, and in its applications of those ideas to legal cases. That
approach is more consen,ative than one that says judges should write their
own values (or what they believe are objectively correct values) into the
· Constitution, but that hardly is enough to recommend it to anyone who is
a true conservative.
In truth, Ackerman's disagreement with Justice Harlan goes to the
roots of the defining elements of conservatism. As one who has benefitted
from Bruce Ackerman's encouragement to think bigger and more
abstractly, I know from personal contact as well as from his writings of
his confidence in the soundness and constructive power of abstract ideas
and in the major social changes they suggest. His dispute with Harlan far
transcends some limited question about the functioning of the American
judiciary: it embraces the most fundamental issues of human understanding
and social philosophy. Harlan was a true conservative. Ackerman's
independent constitutionalist is strongly liberal and a social engineer,
conceding only the point that judges must in some way connect the central
premises of their reasoning to the past and preserve enduring values.
III. CONSERVATISM AND CRAFT

In the remainder of my essay, I want to discuss the connection
between Justice Harlan's conservatism and features of his judicial life on
which Fried and Ackerman comment: his dedicated craftsmanship, his use
of balancing tests, and his rejection of formulaic holdings of the sort found
in Reynolds v. Sims3 8 and Miranda v. Arizona. 39
In a striking paragraph, Fried connects careful craftsmanship to
intellectual honesty and conservatism:
It is this sort of rigorous analysis that characterizes Justice
Harlan's conservatism, an analysis that formed the foundation of
his unshakable conviction about the importance of intellectual
honesty in his opinions. One can only possess this sort of
conviction when one has worked over the record of a case, the
38. 377 U.S. 533 (1964). •
39. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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precedents cited to the Court, and the arguments presented by
counsel. 40
Is "intellectual honesty" connected to great care? That depends on
what one says and the degree of confidence one implies. Suppose after a
slipshod review, one says, ""the legislative history supports the plaintiff."
That alone is not dishonest, if that is one's best guess at the time. But a
judicial opinion holds itself out as being based on extremely careful
review. Someone who has not done the work is being dishonest in
implicitly claiming a foundation for conclusions that do not exist.
How does care relate to conservatism? Certainly we can imagine a
judge of conservative inclinations who is confused, unperceptive, and not
inclined to work hard; there are such judges. We can also imagine a
liberal judge, or an Ackermanian independent constitutionalist, who is an
extremely good craftsman. But I do believe there is a double connection
between being a "legal craftsman" in the traditional sense and being
conservative. For the activist judge, the traditional sources of precedent
and original understanding just matter less than they do for the believer in
judicial restraint. People work harder at and are more careful about things
that matter more to them. Were judicial opinions fully candid, we might
expect most independent constitutionalists to excel at broad historical
interpretation and applications of central concepts of political philosophy,
and the Harlan-like conservatives to master traditional legal sources. But
opinions are not fully candid. Whatever they may believe, or intuitively
perform without understanding, few judges write opinions that are openly
and fully independent constitutionalist. Almost inevitably, judges claim
support from mundane sources like precedent and narrow original intent.
Judges who decide to reach a "good result" that is hard to square with
those sources end up distorting them to reach their conclusions. So long
as activist judges suppose that traditions, or maximum acceptability of
their results, counsel opinions that pretend restraint, their opinions will
have less integrity and reflect less craftsmanship than those of the best
practitioners of restraint.
I do want to say that Justice Harlan's extraordinary craft and sincerity
of opinion flowed primarily from his personal integrity and quality of
mind rather than his conservative philosophy of judging. Near the end of
his essay, Fried says "candor, care, being true to the facts, the record,
and the precedents, and a modest respect for the other institutions that
surround the Supreme Court-these are the hallmarks of Mr. Justice
Harlan's conservative ethic. "41 I embrace this thought if the emphasis is
on "Justice Harlan's" rather than "conservative," but I am uncomfortable
40. Fried, supra note 1, at 49.
41. Id. at 51.
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with how tightly Fried's form of expression ties most of these virtues to
Harlan's conservatism.
How is "balancing," which Justice Harlan favored, connected to
conservatism? Skepticism about abstract ideas and rapid change, and
concentration on particular context, does incline one toward balancing
approaches to the resolution of social problems. But an activist might also
approve of some sorts of balancing formulations. Indeed, the compelling
interest test, which is very hard for the government to surmount, is a kind
of balancing test in which the strength of the government's need is
measured against the strength of a principle that the government violates.
Fried comments that balancing "must respect precedent" and "the
competence and validity of the other decision-making centers. "42
"Respect" is a loose word. Perhaps Fried means only "p~y serious
attention to," but he may also mean "defer to in cases of genuine doubt."
I agree with those who believe the tendency of most balancing tests is to
induce such deference because it is difficult for a court to say that
legislators or prior courts have considered all that is relevant but gotten
the balance wrong. But a Justice less conservative than Justice Harlan
could, with integrity, adopt balancing formulations that are much less
deferential than his own approach. 43 A conservative who employs candid
balancing will properly "respect" in the sense of "defer," but it does not
follow, as perhaps Fried supposes, that balancing works as a method only
when deference is accorded.
Finally, Ackerman writes as if the independent constitutionalist will
accept judicial establishment of code-like rules, such as the Miranda
warnings, whereas a common law constitutionalist will not. 44 He is right
that Justice Harlan was generally resistant to such rules, and that someone
inclined toward common law methods is less likely to embrace them
quickly. Still, one might be conservative, one might believe in developing
the law piece by piece in context, and nevertheless be persuaded that in
a particular area only a code-like solution will yield adequate clarity and
supervision of executive officers. The connection between Harlan's
general judicial approach and nonacceptance of code-like resolutions is
genuine, but it is by no means as tight as Ackerman implies.

42. Id.
43. Recent Canadian constitutional decision making is instructive here. See, e.g., R.
v. Keegstra, 3 S.C.R. 697 (1990) (upholding Parliament's anti-hate propaganda statute as
constitutional because the value of preventing harm caused by the intentional promotion of
hate outweighs the relatively minor impairment of an individual's freedom of expression).
44. Ackerman, supra note 1, at 9-10. Fried makes a similar point in Fried, supra note

1, at 4647.
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IV. SUMMARY
Justice Harlan was a true conservative-a judicial conservative and a
conservative in social philosophy. This much is shown by both Fried and
Ackerman, though I believe Gerald Gunther's comments are a needed
corrective to the overall impressions the two major essays yield. 45
Ackerman insightfully treats Justice Harlan's approach to constitutional
adjudication as resembling that of traditional common law adjudication, a
comparison the Justice himself had drawn. 46 Ackerman makes some
appealing claims for an alternative independent constitutionalist approach,
but he misleadingly parades this approach as if its conservative credentials
are as strong as those of Harlan's approach. Fried is right in finding some
connection between Harlan's conservatism and his craftsmanship and the
use of balancing tests, and Ackerman and Fried correctly discern some
connection between Harlan's conservatism and his disquiet with code-like
·resolutions. But the connections are looser than Fried and Ackerman
suppose. Many judicial conservatives without Justice Harlan's personal
qualities are not only weaker in craft but much less conscientious. Liberals
can reasonably endorse balancing tests and conservatives may find that
occasions call for courts to adopt code-like resolutions.

45. See Gunther, supra note 14.
46. See John M. Harlan, Thoughts at a Dedication: Keeping the /udidal Functions in
Balance, 49 A.B.A. J. 943 (1963), reprinted in THE EVOLUTION OF A JUDICIAL
PlnLOSOPHY: SELECTED OPINIONS AND PAPERS OF JUSTICE JOHN M. HARLAN 289 (David

L. Shapiro ed., 1969).

